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Why Hypocrisy?
Sat, 2006-01-14 04:04 — kzeng
I've just read my comrade ranc's blog about hypocrisy. It's an interesting question, as he states in the first paragraph :
Why do people (politicians and ordinary folks alike) pretend to be publicly spritied and appeal to collective interests in private arguments and public discourses, when often times it is a piece of common knowledge that they are really motivated exclusively by self-interests? If we accept the standard operational assumption of rationality in economics (and political science), why can't people just tell each other what they really want for themselves and strike a honest bargain? Yes it would be a naked bargain, but why pretending to be clothed if all know that all are naked? This is especially bewildering since the truth revelation principle tells us that no outcome can be better than having each other revealing their true types. In a word, why hypocrisy?
He gives several plausible answers and has a thoughtful discussion. But I feel that those answers are not very "neat" in rationalist sense because most of them invoke theories and assumptions from other intellectual traditions ( and sociological one, in particular). According to those hard-core social scientists and followers of Lakatos, solving a problem in this way is theoretically degenerative.
Actually, I don't think this question is difficult for rationalists. Although often times it is a piece of common knowledge that politicians are really motivated exclusively by self-interests, it does not rule out the possibility that the interests of some politicians are "accidentally" identical with that of the median voter. Let's think about the following one-shot game scenario: 1) the public is unclear about a candidate's real preference; 2) the candidate's preference may or may not be idnetical with the median voter; 3) To claim that his preference is the same as the median voter weakly dominates telling the truth because it gives the candidate better chance to win the election. It weakly dominates becaues the public may not believe the claim is informative.
In a different scenario, say, a repeated game. Hypocrisy can be viewed as an investment of reputation. In order to get a better chance to be trusted and thus gain more in the future, a politician may speak and act in accordance with public interests that are quite different from his own in the first stage. And later on, after he is trusted or re-elected, he may take advantage of the trust or position and satisfy his own real desire.
There are many examples in history which indicate the logic above. Han Feizi may be an example for the first scenario; while Wang Mang is for the second.
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Comments
some quick responces: 1. you
some quick responces:
1. your example of median voter is applicable when there is audience to the arguments, which is mentioned in my post. My argument is more general, with or without audiences.
2. the reputation mechanism won't work if all know all are exclusively self-interested, because people simply wouldn't believe your hypocrisy, and know that you're just trying to establish some reputation.
3. If you read my post carefully (which may not worth your while though), you'll see my argument does not invoke other intellectual traditions, but is strictly within the rational choice tradition---I just modify the preferences of the players (not their rationality).
hehe, my comments:
hehe, my comments:
1) In a more realistic setting, audience cost always exists. This is especially true for democarcies, where almost all the debates of politicians are documented. Although for some debates, say, ones in small-scale commission meetings audiences don't physically attend the debate, the public still have access to the records of the debate. And normally news media are allowed to attend. There could be some exceptions, such as debates involving national security or top national secrets. Since the records of this kind of debates are classified, we don't know whether those politicians are hypocritical or not. Here, the logic is straightforward: For every debate we know, the politicians anticipate that we will know it, so they will be hypocritical due to aundience cost; for every debate we don't know, we actually have no idea what they argue about, let alone whether they are hypocritical or not. The audience cost also exists in bargaining between two ordinary persons because both of them are likely to tell their neighbors, friends or community about their debate, from which costs come. In a totally ideal situation where two politicians are talking privately and they know that their talk will not be known by the public, I really doubt they would still be hypocritical. For instance, the talk between President Nixon and his aide which they believe secret was accidentally leaked to the public. And from their talk we can see no hypocrisy at all. So in short, I'd posit that hypocrisy is a result of audience cost. This argument also applies to international politics. Things like sovereignty and human rights are characterized as organized hypocrisy (Krasner, 1999).
2) Even if all know all are exclusively self-interested, it is still possible that the self-interested politician actually have the same underlying interests with the median voter, that is to say, we may not rule out the case of compatible interests. If this is true, politicians would naturally try to convince the public that he is that type. His cheap talk and burned money may not be informative but this strategy still weakly dominates truth-telling.
3) yes, I agree with you that your main points are within the rationalist framework. I should have been clear that the answers I think degenerative are those cited by you which invokes identies, social norms and intersubjective understandings. I am sorry about this.
hehe, another lengthy response:-)
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